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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION—DEPIin TI ON OF THE PROSLEM
Wage policy presents an immediate problem in definition
and a continuing one in attempts at isolation. Perplexing as
the first problem is it poses a minor obstacle in the face of
the second. If the union is regarded as static, it is possible
to define clearly an area of wage policy distinguishable from
other union policy. The definition may be questionable, ar-
bitrary, or imperfect, but it is there as stated. Once the
union is viewed as a living instrument to fulfill human desires
the clearness of the elucidation vanishes. The thread of union
wage policy becomes woven in and often indistinguishable from
all union policy. Tracing its course becomes an arduous task.
Complete isolation is impossible and wage policy must be viewed
in relationship to the other elements it affects. Thus arise
two initial problems, deliniation of area and examination of
the interrelationships between this area and other union
activity.
The broad meaning of wage policy explains itself. Any
policy affecting wages is wage policy. Adequate definition
demands more. What policies affect wages and how do they do
it? These policies may be grouped under two headings, the
direct and the indirect. The direct includes:
1. Changes in the rate of pay (piece and time work)
2. Changes in the number of hours worked.
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The second group often called "fringe wages or fringe issues"
includes:
1. number of paid holidays
2. days of paid vacation
3. premium or bonus payments for overtime or holiday work
4. pension, hospitalization or sickness funds to which
the employer contributes
5. guaranteed annual wage plana*
Now it becomes necessary to look at the relationship be-
tween wage policy and other union activity. This can be done
by examining the objectives of trade-union wage policy. Again
we can divide these ?ims into two classifications, income and
non-income objectives. The income objective is higher wages.
This general wage goal has been expressed with the phrase
"push 'em up". Non-income wage objectives are more subtle.
They include:
1. membership promotion
2. work allocation
3. control over technological innovation
4. control over v/orking conditions
5. control over entrance to trades.
It is necessary to find a yardstick by which union wage
policy can be measured. This study uses two measures. The
first is what the unions say and the second is what they do.
Their statements are representative of what they deem it
expedient to pronounce formally while their contracts represent
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their actual accomplishments. The tvro may be at variance with
themselves over a period of time. Union leaders are experts in
the handling of words and expediency is often a stronger pur-
suader than conviction. Within the speeches of union leaders we
must also further distinguish between what may be said for unionil
consumption and what may be said for public consumption.
Although union contracts provide a better means of studying
wage policy than the printed or spoken testimony of union rep-
resentatives, nevertheless speeches are a valuable guide since
they indicate the reaction of the union to a variety of
situations.
The organization of the study was its easiest task. The
first step was a limitation of the coverage. This was done by
selecting three industries rubber, steel, and automobile. Then
the history of each wage policy was examined from the time of
initial organization under the banner of the C. I. 0. down to
the end of World War II. These three industries v/ere chosen
because (a) they are three of the largest groups v^ithin the
C. I. 0. (h) they were among the first to be organized.
C. I. 0. wage policy divided itself naturally into conven-
ient periods for the writer. The first covered the initial
organizational growth, the second the recession period of
1937-1938, the third the period between recovery in 1938 and
the outbreak of the war, and the last the period of the war
itself. Preceding the discussion of these periods in this
study is a brief sketch of the C. I. O.'s organization and a
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short analysis of factors underlying the organizational drive.
c
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Chapter II
THE BACKGROUND AND FOIINDATIOIT OF THE C. I. 0.
Congress prodded into action a sleeping giant with its
inclusion of the now famous Section 7 (a) in the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. This guarantee to lahor of
the right to bargain collectively "brought almost instantaneous
reaction on the part of labor leaders who saw a chance to
regain ground lost during the 1920' s and to extend their ac-
tivities into hitherto unconquered fields. Automobile, steel,
?nd rubber centers represented areas where union organizers
were only too pleased to be able to renew their activities.
Strengthening this effort was the spontaneous self-organization
of many local workers who began to seek national affiliation.
A period of recovery and generally higher employment in the
closing months of 1933 aided these union efforts, which were
at least partially successful.^
Of far greater importance than any degree of temporary
success, however, were the problems created by these fevered
organizing-drives. Particularly pressing was the one that
had faced the American Federation of Labor since its inception--
craft unionism versus industrial unionism; for the failure to
find its solution was to lead to a schism within the ranks and
ultimately to the creation of the Committee for Organization.
iLo is MacDonald, Labor Problems and the American Scene,
P. 457.
c
That this problem was not new is evidenced "by the history
of the American Federation of Labor. The very origin of the
A. P. of L. was in the strong protests against the dilution of
skilled workers' bargaining powers that occurred under the
old Knights of Labor, the first large American industrial
union. ^ There has been constancy and determination in the
attitude of the A. F. of L. toward this problem since the day
on which Delegate Gompers rose to speak on the afternoon of
the ninth day of the 1901 Convention to set forth the prin-
ciples of trade unionism in the Scranton Declaration.^ Tradi-
tional policy upheld the principles set forth in this Declara-
tion for again in 1903 we find Samuel Gompers stating:
The attempt to force the trade unions into what
has been termed industrial organization is perver-
sive to the history of the labor movement, runs
counter to the best conceptions of the toilers in-
terests now, and is sure to lead to the confusion
which precedes dissolution and disruption. It is
time for the American Federation of Labor to
solemnly call a halt. It is time for our fellow-
unionists entrusted v;ith grave responsibilities to
help stem the time of expansion madness lest either
by their indifference or encouragement engulf them
to their possible dismemberment and destruction.
There is virtue and a great need of praise due in
organizing our fellow-workers that they may defend
and further their interests.
4
^Richard A. Lester, Economics of Labor
, p. 548.
"^''Proceedings of the American Federation of Labor",
1901, p. 240.
^Samuel Gompers, Labor and the Common Welfare
, p. 196.
cc
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This view has been cited time after time by union leaders. In
1936 we find Daniel Tobin, head of the Teamster's union stating,
"To us v;as given a charger, and Gompers, HcGuire, Duncan, Foster
and the others said: 'Upon the rocks of trade autonomy, craft
trades, you shall build the church of the labor movement and
the gates of hell nor trade industrial unionism shall not
prevail against it,'" ^
While this position has at various times been subject to
strong minority pressure it was not until a determined out-
break in 1934 that craft trade unionism was seriously threat-
ened. In this year, however, aggressive agitation demanded
the problem be solved. This growing agitation resulted in a
strong resolution on the part of the International Union of
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers in favor of industrial unionism.^
In response to this and preceding resolutions expressing the
same ideas the following was presented.
During recent years there have developed new
methods. This has brought about a change in the
nature of the work performed by millions of work-
ers in industries which it has been most difficult
or impossible to organize into craft unions.
The provision of the National Industrial Recovery
Act protecting the right of employees to organize
and select representatives of their own choice with-
out interference on the part of employers, or their
Edward Levinson, "The Labor Leaders", Harper'
s
Magazine , 693:17 2, May, 1936.
"Proceedings of the American Federation of Labor",
1934, p. 585.
c
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agents, has had the effect of freeing the organiza-
tion sentiment existing in the "breasts of millions
of workers who have been prevented "by employer
opposition from satisfying their desire for organiza-
ti on.
The American Federation of Lahor is desirous of
To meet this new condition the Executive Council
is directed to issue charters for National or Inter-
national Unions in the automotive, cement, aluminum,
and such other mass production and miscellaneous
industries as in the judgment of the Executive Council
may be necessary to meet the situation.'''
The resolutions of the 1934 Convention did not result in
increased activity. Unions were still not being organized
along industrial lines. Dissatisfaction burst into the open
with the Minority Report of the Resolutions Committee on Organ-
ization Policies at the 1935 Convention. This report signed
by Charles P. Howard, David Dubinsky, Frank B. Powers, John L.
Lewis, A. A. Myrup, and J. C. Lewis stated very bluntly:
v/e refuse to accept existing conditions as evidence
that the organization policies of the A. F. of L. have
been successful. The fact that after fifty-five years
of activity and effort we have enrolled under the banner
of the American Federation of Labor approximately three
and one-half millions of members of the thirty-nine
millions of organizable workers is a condition that
speaks for itself.®
The resolution also stated that the Executive Council
nad not fulfilled its obligation to organize workers and could
30 so only by granting unrestricted charters to industrial
'''ibid., pp. 586-587.
8»«Proceedings of the American Federation of Labor,"
L935, p. 523.
ce
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unions in accordance v^ith its powers. These charters, further-
more, mu!3t dispell the fears of workers that unity of action
would be destroyed through the recognition of jurisdictional
claims made hy National or International Unions. It was clearly
pointed out, at the same time, that a more active organizing-
policy was needed.^
The breach thus effected subsequently proved to be one
that was never healed. On ITovember 9, 1935, the Committee for
Industrial Organization was formed in Washington. It was
composed of eight international unions^^ and had as its chair-
man John L. Lewis. Mr. Lewis resigned as vice-president of
the American Federation of Labor two weeks later, and on
January 22, 1936, the Executive Council of the American Federal
condemned the C. I. 0. as injurious to trade unionism. The
debate which followed organizing of the steel industry ended
with the creation of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee
and the Affiliation of the Amalgamated Iron, Steel and Tin
workers with the C. I. 0. On June 30 the C. I. 0. was called
to answer a charge of dualisim by the Executive Council, but it
did not answer the summons. Finally a suspension order v/as
^Ibid . , pp. 523-524
^^These original unions were: United Mine Workers;
Amalgamated Clothing Workers; International Ladies Garment
Workers; International Typographical Union; Oil Field, Gas
Well, and Refinery Workers; United Textile Workers; United
Hatters, Cap, Millinery Workers; and the International Mine,
Mill and Smelter Workers.
e
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issued "by the A. of L. and on September 5, the lahor move-
ment WHS split into two independent groups. The threatened
schism had become a "fait accompli", and a new era in the
history of labor had begun.
Like Minerva, Roman godess of wisdom and patroness of the
arts and trades, fabled to have sprung fully armed and with a
tremendous battle cry, from the head of Jupiter, the Congress
of Industrial Organization loosed itself as a full-grown
offspring of the American Federation of Labor, heralding its
own birth with the strident clamor of oratory. That Mr. Green
was surprised to have sired such a monster is a mild supposi-
tion. Moreover his surprise was shared by millions of Americans
who were to see unfolded in the years ahead a drama that was
to change the organization of American unionism.
This chapter has served as a brief sketch of the creation
of the C. I. 0. It has shown that while the leaders of this
newly created organization were conditioned and developed
within the folds of the A. P. of L., they had been dissatisfied
with the parent organization and were dynamically and agres-
sively interested in extending industrial unionism to new
fields. Their first major task was organization. Wage policy
in the organizing period is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter III
THE ORGANIZING PERIOD
On July 3, 1936, the following statement appeared in the
New York Times, "Two new unions, the United Automohile Worker's
Union and the United Rubber Worker's Union were welcomed into
the industrial union block at today's meeting."^ This state-
ment by the Committee for Industrial Organization indicated
its decision to attempt to organize the rubber and automobile
industries.
Later on that same day John L. Lewis told newspaper corre-
spondents "The Committee will support its new allies, the
rubber and auto workers in their organizing campaigns. The
former has 28,000 members in an industry of 108,000 and the
latter has 60,000 in an industry of 350,000 employees.
As the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, which had been
established in June, 1936, was already active in organizing
steel, this meant that the C. I. 0. was to attack the rubber
and automobile industries as well. For decades these three
fields had resisted, in bitter and often bloody clashes, all
attempts at organization.^
New York Times, July 3, 1936, 4:2.
pLog. cit .
•^Robert R. R. Brooks, As Steel Goes, p. 15.
J
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Unionization of these areas was accomplished only by
tremendous effort. Wage policy was the most important weapon
in the attack. Workers were influenced to Join unions by
factors other than promises of wage increase but these factors
were invariably supported by a union promise to prospective
members that stated in essence, "Join the union and obtain
higher wages." A strong case can be argued that wage increases
are absolutely essential for union organization. In commenting
on this technique, a contemporary magazine, IJewsweek , said of
the first union contracts in steel, "One of arresting things
about the present contracts is that the union can't claim much
in the way of concrete benefits; practically all the agreements
simply put prevailing conditions into writing. That may have
something to do with the poor showings that S. W. 0. C. has
made on dues collections; it certainly will have a great deal
to do with approaching negotiations.
"Can the union hold its membership without being able to
say: 'We got you this and that?'"*
The C. I. 0. made wage increases their principal organiz-
ing device. This was a particularly advantageous time to do
so. In 1935, employment, wage, and hour statistics for the
Report on Labor's Record; " A Tale of Two Industries",
Newswe_ek, 10:36, ITovember 15, 1937.
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steel, rubber and automobile industries were:
Average Hours^ Average Hourly^ Total Emplojrraent'''
per week Earnings
Full Time Pull Time (Thousands)
Emplovees Employees'^
Automobile 37.4 $ .752 445
Iron and Steel 34.2 $ .655 777
Rubber 33.1 $ .801 115
#lTote: Hourly earnings are not wage rates because they include
overtime and other monetary compensation.
Wage increases proved a two-headed Janus. Employers were
as cognizant of the importance of wages to the workers as were
union leaders. They did not hesitate to grant increases as a
means of preventing unionization. The effectiveness of this
policy is hard to evaluate, but in cases where this policy was
unsuccessful they generally found themselves granting a second
increase to the newly organized union.
Union leaders were quick to point out to employees these
anti-union wage tactics.® By this means they could indirectly
^The Management Almanac, 1946. National Industrial
Conference Board, 1946. pp. 84-85.
^Ibid., pp. 80-81.
"^United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor
Stati sties.
^Clinton S. Golden and Harold J. Ruttenberg cite the fol-
lowing in The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy, pp. 20-21.
"In the hope of weakening the auto worker's union the
General Motors Corporation raised wages five cents an hour in
February, 1937, only to see it grow stronger. 'Little Steel'
granted its employees the economic gains won by S.W.O.C. in
March, 1937, but these worker's were on the picket line that
summer and, though set back at the time, recovered to win union
recognition four years later The economic concessions
management granted accelerated instead of impeded union
progress "
I
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claim credit for the wage increase and also declaim to the
employees the perfidy of management. In the organizing period
the wage struggle became a duel with the union and the employer
attempting to gain opposite results with the same weapon, wage
policy.
The strategic importance of steel to the United Mine
Workers, the guiding "body behind the C. I. 0., made it the
logical starting point for unionization. As long as steel re-
mained unorganized and controlled the so-called "captive" coal
mines, it threatened other union mine organizations. The
surest way to remove this threat was to organize steel. A
debate did ensue among C. I. 0. leaders as to whether the auto-
mobile industry had not replaced steel as the strongest anti-
union industry and hence had become the logical point for attack
but it was finally decided to attack steel first.
^
Wage policy as an organization device was used in steel as
a method of combatting company unions. The Steel Worker's
Organizing Committee placed its men on the representation boards
of the company unions. These men pressed for wage increases so
large that the company was forced to refuse them. Then the
S. W. 0. C. publicized the ineffectiveness of the company unions
and promised the workers real representation after unionization.'^^
Witness the headline that appeared in Steel Labor ;
"Company Union Representatives Press Hard For Wage Increases As
Brooks, 0£. cit . , pp. 243-244.
^^Ibid., 95-97.
i
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S. ¥. 0. C. Lends Inspiration And Authority To The Movement
•
This technique was only the opening gun in the use of wage
policy as an organizing device. On July 10, 1936, Philip
Murray was quoted in the Hew York Times in answer to a company
wage claim at Homestead as follows: "As a matter of fact, the
steel management likes to cite that its workmen make as high
as |15 a day in Homestead. Of the 8,000 workmen, exclusive of
hosses, there are just thirty-six men who have a chance to
make $15 a day and these when the mill is rolling along at a
capacity production. More than 75 per cent of the workers
there average only $3.50 a day when they work."^^
On July 14th of the same year the following report was
made on the unionization drive at Bethlehem, "The C. I. 0.
organizers assert that wages in the Bethlehem plant are less
than in the Pittsburgh district. Here basic hourly pay for
laborers is 41 cents. In Pittsburgh it is 47-|- cents. They
say there are other variations, and stress the point that only
through unionization can such matters as wage rates be settled
satisfactorily for the workers. "•^•^ The unionization drive was
fully on, featuring as its principal weapon attacks on the
existing wage structure and promising (as a reward for union-
ization) higher wages.
Steel Labor , September 25, 1936, p. 1.
^New York Times
,
July 10, 1936, 6:2.
^Few York Times
,
July 14, 1936, 13:2.
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The reaction of C. I. 0. leaders to portions of the industrjj
which showed wage increases or promises of wage increases fol-
lowed the general pattern outlined earlier in this Chapter.
Philip Murray's comment on a wage offer made in July of 1936 hy
the United States Steel Corporation was "The statement made
today by the United States Steel Corporation is merely another
strategem on the part of the steel corporation and other steel
companies to discourage unionization of their employees.
The so-called concession means nothing to the workers in the
industry but is just another effort on the part of the steel
corporations to bedevil the issue and beguile the people. "-^^
In August, John L. Lewis made the following reply to a
statement by the American Iron and Steel Institute, "A second
point to be noted in the Institute's wage statement is that
earnings in the steel industry have been exceptionally high in
recent months. This has been due in large part, of course, to
the organizing campaign that the C. I. 0. has been carrying on;
as always happens in such cases the steel industry seeks to
counteract the effects of the campaign by temporary improvements
in wages and working conditions and by stimulating production."
The end of the organizing period in steel left part of the
industry still unorganized,^^ The wage policy had been
15
^%ew York Times, July 25, 1936, 18:1.
^5^ew York Times
,
August 3, 1936, 16:1.
•^^The C.I.O . News raiade the following statement on April 23,
1938. "The job of unionizing steel is not complete, but about
85% of the industry has been unionized. The fight will continue
until every steel mill is under contract with the S.W.O.C.".

17
consistent and clear. It was a promise on part of the union to
obtain a higher wage as a reward for organization.
The actual increases in wages obtained by the C. I. 0. are
difficult to estimate, although Philip Murray gave the follow-
ing evaluation, "In 1936 and 1937 the Steel Workers Organizing
Committee raised average wages for hourly, piece work, and
tonnage workers twenty-six per cent, or from 66.8 cents per
hour in August, 1936, to 84.3 cents per hour in September, 1937
(both months being comparable in production). During this same
period total monthly payrolls rose in proportion to average
hourly earnings--a monthly payroll rise of a little more than
fourteen and one-half million dollars, or from ^52,200,000 to
^66,800,000.
The New Republic estimated that the C. I. 0. had earned
18increases in wages amounting to a billion dollars a year.
The story of the organizing period in the rubber and
automobile industries showed a pattern parallel to that of
steel with respect to wage policy. The union promised the
workers wage increases in return for their support.
The familiar charges were hurled against the employers by
the union wherever pay increases were granted at the time of
attempted organization.-^^
^'''Golden and Ruttenberg, o^. cit
. , p. 152.
18"The C.I.O. Advances" New Republic, 92:257, October 13,
1937.,
„
--^Tor descriptive studies of the organizing drives see
The Rubber Workers by Harold S. Roberts for the rubber industry
pnd Labor Relati on s In The Automobile Industry by William H.
McPherson for the automobile industry.
i
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Homer Martin, President of the United AutoxnolDile Workers
of America, cited the following ohjectives in the membership
drive that the organization was about to launch in the auto-
motive industry, "An annual wage of not less than $2,000,
quarterly bonuses on profits, vacation with pay, thirty hour
20
week and no reduction in pay."
That the proposed program was to meet with opposition on
the part of employers was also indicated by Mr. Martin when he
pointed out that, since recent negotiations f or a merger of
the union with independent organizations of automobile workers,
one large factory had announced a two-week vacation with pay
for its employees and another had granted a wage increase of
5 cents an hour. The latter concession, he went on to state,
had been refused by the company as an "impossible demand" when
presented by the union.
Prior to 1933 unionism was of no importance in the auto-
mobile industry. Prom 1933 to 1936 there was considerable
union activity but little recognition. The organization known
as the United Automobile Workers of America was created by the
A. P. of L. in August, 1935. In April, 1936, it was granted
complete autonomy by the A. F. of L. At this time it had
about 27,000 members.
In July, 1936, the organization joined the Committee for
Industrial Organization. This affiliation marked the beginning
liE l££]± Times , June 25, 1936, 7:2.
21loc. cit.
c
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of a vigorous organization campaign. By July, 1937, the union
had increased its memhership to 370,000.'^'^
The United Ruhber Workers joined the C. I. 0. in July, 1936
Memhership at this time was between twenty-five and thirty
thousand. It had already experienced clashes with employers,
who had been reluctant to grant union recognition.
Employers continued to oppose unionism violently. The
workers resorted to the sit-down strike and feelings flared.
The rubber manufacturers argued that the higher wages demanded
by the unions were causing them to suffer a cost disadvantage
when they competed with producers in non-union, low wage areas.
They threatened to move from Akron, where the rubber industry
was concentrated. The union replied that these charges were
unfounded.
In spite of these obstacles, organization proceeded rap-
idly, and, at their second annual convention in September, 1937,
the union claimed 75,000 workers. Wages also had risen sharply.
One of the "Big Pour", Firestone, signed a union agreement on
April 28, 1937, and on the same day the remaining three, Good-
year, Goodrich and U. S. Rubber announced the abandonment of
their company unions.^^
^%illiam Keston McPherson, Labor Relations in the
Automobile Industry
, pp. 1-20.
23Harold S. Roberts, The Rubber Workers, p. 147.
24The United Rubber Worker
, October 1937, p. 6 reported
that average weekly wages rose from $21 to $28 during the period
from May, 1934 to May, 1937.
25Roberts, ojq. cvt.
, pp. 155-161.
^^The Wagner Act made company unions illegal.
c
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That the union had achieved a measure of success is eviden-
ced by Charles Walker* s statement that weekly earnings in all
rubber products were up 10.1 per cent and that Akron's "Big
Pour" all paid top wages for a six hour day.
The organizing period showed a tremendous increase in
C. I. 0. membership in rubber, steel and automobiles, but Ford
was still unorganized in the automobile industry, "Little Steel"
in the steel industry, and three of the "Big Pour" in rubber.
Nevertheless union growth was unparalleled in the history of
labor.
Average hourly earnings, employment, and average hours
worked rose during this period. It is impossible to determine
what portion of this rise, if any, should be credited to the
C. I. 0. The statistics at the end of 1937 for wages, hours and
unemployment were
:
Average Hours^^Average Hourly^^Total Employment^^
per ¥eek Earnings
Full Time Pull Time (Thousands)
Employee 3 Employee 3#
Automobile
Iron and Steel
Rubber
35.3
36.3
33.3
^ .916
$ .818
$ .847
517
1,021
130
#lTote: Hourly earnings are not wage rates because they
include overtime and other monetary compensation.
27Charles R. Walker, "Life Curve of a C.I.O. Union",
Survey Graphic
, 27:558, November 1938.
28
29
The National Industrial Conference Board, 0£. cit .
Ibid., pp. 80-81.
30United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
c
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Thus during the two year period 1935-1937 average hours per
week fell 2.1 hours in the automohile industry, rose 2.1 hours
in the steel industry, and rose .1 of an hour in the rubber
industry. Average hourly earnings increased 16.4 cents in
automobile, 16.3 cents in steel and 1.7 cents in rubber. Total
employment in the automobile industry rose 16 per cent, in the
steel industry 31 per cent and in the rubber industry 13 per
cent.
The job of unionization, however, was incomplete. As long
as non-union areas remained in these three industries they
influenced union policy. As Professor Slichter*^^ so admirably
points out, the union may be a creator of insecurity rather
than security if it raises costs in union plants above those in
non-union plants. The call of unionization then becomes a death
knell to the industries which embrace it. The most obvious and
complete union answer to this difficulty is the total union-
ization of the industry.
The beginnings of a philosophy of unionism which minimized
32the role of wage policy appeared in this period. This approacl^
to unionism emphasized the psychological and socialogical as
the following quotation indicates, "The C. I. 0. has always em-
phasized that it proposed not only a correction of grievances
but a change in labor's status. And it is interesting to note
31 Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policie
s
and Industrial
Management
,
Chapters XII and XIII.
32This broadened aspect of unionism is well illustrated by
Golden and Ruttenberg in Dynamics of Industrial Democracy .
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that whereas in the great wave of postwar (World V/ar l) strikes,
76 per cent were fought over wages and hours, in 1936, 50 per
cent were waged primarily for union recognition Through
the radio, the press, and even the pulpit, it has "been careful
to offer not only higher wages, "but a philosophy of industrial
relations.^'5
In an article in November, 1937, ITew Republic stated the
following: "^^Hiat the C. I. 0. needs is a research organiza-
tion, with regional offices and staffs to assemble and analyze
regularly the relevant facts about the companies and industries
with which it deals, to explore the industrial makeup of the
country, the conditions of the working class, and the nature
of secular influences that are molding their lives. "^^
This article foresaw the development of union research
organizations which soon became a necessity with the advent
of "statistical" bargaining by both employer and union repre-
sentatives. It is beyond the scope of this study to trace the
development of these agencies but by January, 1943, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics had record of 53 labor organizations which
maintained a research department or formally assigned duties
of economic research to an officer of their organization.
Mr. Bortz in writing of those organizations stated,
"Union research - as this terra applies to activities of Labor
Organizations in their study of and factual approach to social
Op
. cit
. ,
Survey-Graphic, p. 554.
^^"Problems Ahead for the C.I.O." New Republic , 93:8,
Hovember 10, 1937. =_==__=
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and economic problems of concern to workers - has expanded
tremendously during the past decade The need for and
usefulness of union research has been acknowledged by officers
of both large and small unions, and the thoroughness of some
of the studies produced by union research directors has com-
manded the respect of employers and government of f icials. ""^^
Nelson M. Bortz, "Research Work of Trade Unions",
Monthly Labor Review
, 56:2, February, 1943.
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Chapter IV
THE 1937-1938 RECESSION PERIOD
In August of 1937 the physical volume of industrial produc-
tion as measured by the Federal Reserve Bop rd Index, stood at
120; by IToveraber it had fallen to 95 and from November until May,
1938 it fell steadily, reaching a low in the latter month of 80.
Then it reversed itself and reached 100 again in November of
1938.^ This period, covering approximately from November, 1937,
to the end of 1938, was a business recession. It presented a
strong challenge to the newly created unions, nearly as great,
in fact, as employer opposition.
This time of declining production had many of the typical
characteristics of a business depression. Unemployment in-
creased as production was restricted in the face of a falling
price level. Business men were attempting to reduce costs in
order to sell at lower prices. Great pressure was being exerted
upon wages to force them downward to readjust the cost-price
,
^These figures are taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin
September, 1940, p. 979. The complete data for these months are:
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD IKDB'A
Physical Volume of Industrial Production
(1923-25 = 100)
1937 August 120 1938 April 82
September 115 jjay qq
October 107 june 81
November 95 july 86
December 87 August 90
1938 January 86 September 92
February 84 October 95
Inarch 84 November 100
Decpmbpr im
1
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relationship. Business men and other critics were quick to
point out "artificially high wages" as a causal factor for the
depression and demand wage cuts as a solution.
The C. I. 0. had shown mushroom growth in the years of
relative prosperity but this sudden down-swing of the "business
cycle created a different "background. Wage policy underv/ent
radical change in this period. The problem "became not one of
o"btaining new members but one of retaining old. Historically,
periods of depression have been highly detrimental to unionism.
If the C. I. 0. was to complete its organization program, it had
to prove its ability to survive the recession period.
The National Association of Manufacturers announced on
December 9, 1937, a "Platform for American Industry for 1938".
In this platform was included the following: "The group that
has already admitted in speeches that a depression of uncertain
gravity is now in presence and that lay-offs are proceeding,
voted without dissent that progress could be resumed only if
industry was unshackled by government and labor.
James K. Perkins, chairman of the board of directors of
the National City Bank of New York, stated: "When we mention
labor costs we recognize that the purpose of organized society
is to provide a higher and more satisfying standard of life
See Gottfried Kaberler, Prosperity ?nd Depression
,
Chapter 10 and 11 for a general description of a business
recession.
^New York Times, December 9, 1937, 1:9.
Ii
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for all people. Prosperous labor means a prosperous people....
but the moment an increase in labor cost raises the price of
goods beyond the capacity of consumers to buy, trade and unem-
ployment necessarily decline and labor instead of gaining has
lost.«4
Paul H. Nystrom, president of Limited Variety Stores, in
declaring that artificial price and wage controls were primar-
ily responsible for the current depression, v/ent on to say,
"The continued establishment of minimum wage rates by law or by
union regulation at substantiallj'- higher levels than now exist
are certain to throw additional thousands of workers, now at or
close to the margin of practical employment out of work and so
increase the burdens of unemployed."
These v/ere only a few of the opening guns fired in an
attempt to gain wage reductions. The C. I. 0. was soon faced
v/ith efforts on all fronts to reduce wages. Its response was '
immediate and energetic. President Roosevelt keynoted the
drive v/hen he "clearly and unequivocally" went on record in
opposition to wage-cutting as a way to reduce prices. The
President asserted that to cast the burden of a temporary
business recession upon the workers "is not only moral bankruptcy"
but the bankruptcy of sound business judgment."^
"^Eew York Times
,
January 12, 1938, 29:6.
^New York Times
,
February 2, 1938, 26:3.
^New York Times
, January 26, 1938, 1:8.
t
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On the aame day John L. Lewis addressed the Convention of
United Mine Workers, stating that organized lahor would fight
price reductions aimed to stimulate recovery if they were based
upon wage cuts. Mr. Lewis asserted wage reductions would pre-
cipitate "a complete and most devesting economic, social and
political dehacle . ""^
The C. I. O.'s plan for fighting the depression was out-
lined by Mr. Lewis in the C. I. 0. News as follows: "Por
Labor let me say this: as I understand what is in the hearts
and the minds of members of organized labor in this country and
in the hearts and minds of every member of our great union,
labor will fight and resist wfige reductions to the bitter end.
In coal, in steel, in automobiles, and glass, and in
lumber, pnd in other basic industries labor will oppose wage
reductions as a solution for the conditions that now beset the
country, because labor has bought its knowledge and experience,
and its conviction on that subject through long years of trial
and sacrifice . "®
In the rubber industry by December, 1937, economic forces
were in sharp reverse. Throughout the country employers and
workers faced not an expanding market for rubber products, but
a contracting one. In Akron labor trouble boiled again.
Early in the Spring of 1938 the General Executive Board of
the U. R. W. A. published a protest against proposals to
"^
ITew York Times
, January 26, 1938, 1:7.
^The C. I. 0 . News, February 19, 1938.
i
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lengthen hours and reduce wages. "Such a Tnovement , " the Board
affirmed, "would delay the re- employment of those nov/ jobless,
would result in even greater unemployment than is now prevalent,
and would present a severe threat to the wage structure of the
nation.
Newsweek, commenting on this situation, said, "Underlying
the Akron controversy are opposed and powerful forces; on the
one hand, the pressure for lower wages, costs, and prices to
meet depression conditions; on the other hand organized labor's
insistence that a cut anyv/here m.ight he a prelude to a collapse
of wages everywhere
.
On March 26, the following headline appeared in the C.I.O.
News, "Rubber Union Checks Slash In ¥age Rates". The article
protested a 17-|- per cent v/age cut proposed by Goodrich. A
large demonstration was staged, and the article claimed that
Goodrich's threat of moving 5,000 jobs out of Akron if the wage
cut was resisted was coercion and a violation of the National
Labor Relations Act.^'^
The steel industry was also resisting all attempts of wage
cuts. On February 21, 1938, Philip Murray spoke to C. I. C.
unionists in Cleveland. He said that the C. I. 0. had "def-
initely stemmed the tide of wage degradation" and concluded
10
Walker, 0£. cit . , p. 558.
'Newsweek
. 11:35-36, April 4, 1938.
^^The C.I.O. News , March 26, 1938.
/
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that eleven weeks ago steel leaders had reason to believe that
they would get a wage reduction "but that this had been circiAin-
vented by the action of the union.
On May 14, Mr. Murray repeated the familipr theme while
addressing delegates to the Amalgamated Clothing Workers con-
vention at Atlantic City. The tenor of his speech can be
determined by this quotation, "The C. I. 0. has saved the wage
structure of the country; it has saved the purchasing power of
the people. "-^^
With regard to specific wage agreements and actual contract
signing, the following excerpt from an article in the C. I. 0.
News is indicative of general union procedure, "The note
throughout was one of steady advance, both in renev/ing old wage
rates of contrrcts won in more prosperous times and in signing
up companies that had never dealt with unions before
Philip Murray, chairman of the S. W. 0. C. reported 525,000
members under contract with more than 500 firms. Each of the
contracts made last, Murray said, had been renev/ed without
wage cuts many of them with wage raisesl*"'"^
The following charge was hurled against Chrysler,
"Chrysler is using the recession as a club to fight all contract
modifications asked by the U. A. M. negotiators."^^
•^%ew York Times
,
February 21, 1938, 11:3.
•^^The C.I.O . ITews
,
May 14, 1938.
^^The C.I.O. News, April 16, 1938.
l^The C.I.O . News, April 2, 1938.
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Wage cuts in the automobile industry were vigorously
opposed, and, at the Michigan Convention of C. I. 0. Unions,
delegates voiced opposition to wage cuts in any form. They also
voted to establish a city-wide strike committee and minute-man
picket squads for use against wage slashing employers.
The over-all picture of union resistance to wage reductions
continued as the depression hit its bottom in May. Sidney
Hillman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, v;as quoted as follows in the Nev/ York Times , "Take the
Committee for Industrial Organization out of the picture and
labor and the country will quickly face the catastrophe of the
early thirties vrithout the reserves which the nation had at
that time." He then went on to claim that the C. I. 0. had
1 7
allayed the slump by maintaining wages.
On May 13, John L. Lewis, addressing the Clothing Workers,
summed up the C. I. 0. depression-policy as follov/s, "During
the depression the C. I. 0. is not spending vast sums of money
in a futile attempt to organize among those who have no jobs.
The committee is now perfecting its organization to be of
service to the idle and is preserving the integrity of its
unions. But just the day the economic tide turns, as turn it
will, the Committee will spring into action and we will see an
16
C. I. 0. News, April 16, 1938
17,TITew York Times, May 10, 1938, 7:1.
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m
organizing campaign in the ranks of labor th?t has never before
been duplicated."-^®
Turning to wage policies, he indicated that labor would not
only oppose wage reductions, but would ask for higher wages and
an increased participation in the greater productivity of
industry.
This is interesting as both an admission and a promise on
the part of Mr. Lewis. Made at the depth of the depression,
it clearly showed that organization had largely ceased and the
union was devoting its energy primarily to preserving its pre-
sent position.
It also indicated, however, that plans to continue its
organizing program were even then a vital part of union policy,
and it forecast a new war of organization in the recovery
period.
Evidence of labor's willingness to attempt only to main-
tain its present level of wages was emphasized by Mr. Lewis
in his statement in the New York Times that he stood with
President Roosevelt in opposition to v/age cuts.-^^ This also
Indicated that labor v/as continuing to receive the support of
the government in its attempts to avoid wage reduction.
The economic argument used by the trade unions was a
purchasing power theory of wages. The purchasing-power theory
18
New York Times, May 13, 1938, 5;1.
19
New York Times, July 2, 1938, 2:2.
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is advocated as a method of "bolstering consumer spending power
by maintaining or increasing the wage level. The theory-
assumes thst this purchasing power in the hands of the consumer
will halt the dov/nward movement of prices and thus prevent a
period of liquidation. If more people have more money to spend,
this will mean greater sales which will lead to greater "business
activity and hence recovery.
Two important facts must he taken into account, however,
if the results of the application of the theory are to he
properly determined. These are the effects of wages upon em-
ployment and upon the price level. If any rigidity or increase
in the wage structure leads to an increase in unemployment or
a rise in prices, these factors will negate the effect desired.
If the price rise is sharp or the increase in unemployment
great, there may he, in fact, an accentuation of the depression
and a cumulative down-swing of the cycle.
The arguments put forth by the C. I. 0. ignored these
considerations. Although faced with increasing unempl03n]ient as
the depression progressed, the union in no way indicated that
the rigidity of the wage structure could have been one of the
contributing factors.
There were no statements made in the material covered by
the writer in which a union leader indicated any awareness
that rigid wage level might increase rather than decrease unem-
ployment. Emily Clark Brown drew the same conclusion in her
study of collective bargaining in the mass production
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industries. She states, "financially there are the gains in
wages. Increases in rates and the ironing out of inequalities
betv;een johs v;ere very numerous, while wage cuts were prevented
in the depression. Any doubts whether some of these gains in
wage rates might have "been counterbalanced by lessened employ-
ment or higher prices were seldom met among the unionist s.
The government also felt that if the em.pl oyers were forced
to seek price reductions they should not be made at the expense
of labor's vrage. The fact that employers and critics were kind
enough to point out the probable fallacy in the purchasing-
power theory in no way deterred either labor or government from
their stand.
At the end of 1938 wage, hour, and eraployTnent statistics
7/ere
:
Average Hours^^Average Hourly^^Total Employment^^
per week Earnings
Full Time Full Time (Thousands)
Employees Employee s#
Automobile 32.3 ^ .953 305
Iron and Steel 27.6 $ .830 762
Rubber 30.3 $ .841 101
#Note: Hourly earnings are not wage rates because they
include overtime and other monetary compensation.
In the year 1937-1938 average hours per week fell 3.0 in
automobile, 6.0 in steel, and 3.0 in rubber. Average hourly
^^Emily Clark Brown, "The New Collective Bargaining In Mass
Production: Methods, Results, Problems", The Journal of Politica
Economy
,
February, 1939, pp. 61-62.
21The Management Almanac
, 1946, National Industrial Confer-
ence Board, 1946. pp. 84-85.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 80-81.
23
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
I
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earnings increased 3.7 cents for automobile, increased 1.2 cents
for steel and fell .6 cents for rubber. Total employment fell
41 per cent in automobile, 25 per cent in steel, and 22 per
cent in rubber.
Labor was able to maintain its hourly wage effectively but
suffered a considerable loss in unemployment and a decline in
hours worked. The C. I. 0. did "weather" the recession and
this was a notable achievement in view of the previous exper-
iences of large unions with periods of depression. The union
gofil of maintaining wage rates at their 1937 levels had been
largely realized. The cost had not been adequately considered
in the light of unemployment but this was apparently a purpose-
ful oversight. The union cry, "resist all wage cuts", had
become an accomplished fact.
Union prestige was unshaken, for the wage gains made in the
organizing period had not been lost in the recession. Every
union leader had rallied to the cause and decried any cut in
wages as impossible. The amount of unemployment caused by
union wage policy could not be ascertained, and it may not have
been as important as other factors but the cost to be reckoned
for the union was not unemployment but rather loss of prestige
through wage reduction. How large a part the backing of the
government played in their "success" is difficult to determine,
but what the results might have been in the face of a hostile
rather than a friendly government atmosphere make an interesting
conjecture
.
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Chapter V
THE ADMINISTRATIVE FERIOD
With the beginning of recovery in late 1938, the C. I. 0.
entered a new phase in the history of its wage policy. The
term, "administrative period", is used here to designate this
interval. The period "began with recovery and ended with the
outbreak of the Second World War.
This term, "administrative period", was often used by
union leaders themselves to designate union functions in the
period of maturity after the initial growth. The union leaders
felt that the initial problem was to secure employer recognition
and establish the union upon a secure foundation.
Once the union felt secure, however, the scope of their
activity could enlarge and collective bargaining would take
place on a broader level with the union and the employer meeting
as partners in industry to discuss their problems over the
bargaining table.
Union growth continued during this period. It was not
until 1941 that the C. I. 0. was able to unionize "Little Steel",
Ford, and the last of the major rubber firms. Membership
figures of established areas also increased. The United Auto-
mobile Workers invaded the aircraft industries, which were
stimulated into tremendous expansion first by the defense boom,
and later by the v/ar itself. Here they were able to organize
the workers.
i
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The C. I. 0., however, offered a nev; and "broadened con-
cept of wage policy easily distinguishable from its organizing
wage policy. It did continue to use its organizing techniques,
hut the new phase extended the meaning and area of wages beyond
the traditional union concept of hours and working conditions.
Wage differentials presented a plant and a geographical
problem. A wide variety of rates existed in the mass produc-
tion industries due to the tremendous advances made in produc-
tion techniques. The rates were often based on precedent
rather than the v/orker*s contribution. As Golden and Ruttenberg
state, "Narrowing the spread between high and low rates in the
steel industry is essential to the development of a wage
structure that will be most conducive to industrial peace.
But the eventual solution of this problem requires industry
wide action, because advancing technclogy--the po\?er age
attaining maturity--is making the entire concept of the basis
for wage payments obsolete. Industry's wage system has been
predicated upon the muscular contribution of workers in several
classifications of work, while increasingly during the last two
decades this source of productive pov/er has been losing its
dominant role in the conversion of America's raw materials into
finished goods.
Geographical wage differentials created the problem of
non-union competition. As long as non-union areas existed
^Clinton S. Golden and Harold J. Rittenberg, "Dynamics of
Industrial Democracy", p. 304.
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within the industries the existence of the unions was threat-
ened. 2 Unions in Akron had seen the problem create bitter con-
troversy when management threatened to move to non-union areas
in order to secure low wage rates. The automobile industry also
had problems of geographical wage differential s to be solved.
The solution to the problem was twofold. First a reclassi-
fication of plpnt wage rates was written into new contracts and
secondly the area of collective bargaining was extended to
include more of the industry. This movement stimulated the
development of the industry-wide bargaining technique. This
became a goal for which the C. I. 0. worked, since dealing with
B whole industry would permit elimination of non-union compe-
tition and establishment of new rates and job classifications
for ell the industry rather than for segments of it.
Nev/ steel, rubber, and automobile contracts included pro-
T-isions for reclassification and simplification of the plant
job structure. This procedure v/as often encouraged by manage-
nent which was hampered by an unwieldly rate-structure. The
anions* greatest difficulty was in raising the floor of the
vage level in order to benefit the great mass of unskilled
NTorkers without raising the wages of the skilled groups. These
skilled groups were determined to maintain their relative
position. This problem was most acute in steel where the
2
See Chapter III, page 21.
(
38.
greatest technological changes had occurred and hence the most
outmoded wage structure existed.
Technological innovation presented a further problem of
unemployment. The union attacked this problem directly through
its wage policy. Professor Slichter indicates that the unions
react to technological change by three principal policies:^
(1) policy of obstruction,
(2) policy of competition,
(3) policy of control.
Wage policy is an important element in each of these. Exces-
sively high wage rates may be an instrument of obstruction,
lower wage rates may be an instrument of competition, and
adjusted rates may be pn instrument of control. Shorter working
hours were advocated by unions as a method of offsetting the
labor saved by the installation of a technological improvement.
There was little evidence that the union considered the
potential long-run effect of technological changes. No mention
was made of an increased demand due to a lower price. The im-
mediate concern was a short-run consideration. Avoiding
unemployment was of paramont importance to the union.
The C. I. 0. continued to broaden its wage policy.
Traditionally unionism had concerned itself with wages, hours,
and v/orking conditions. Wage policy had been interpreted
rather narrowly and the management had been left to exercise its
other functions.
Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial
Management
, Chapters VII, VIII, IX.
c
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With the inclusion in new contracts of seniority provisions
lay-off and rehiring plans, and grievance adjustment plans, the
management found that it was no longer free to hire or fire
employees freely. It was forced to consult the union on hiring,
rescheduling of work, promotions, discharges, transfers, and joll
and shift assignments.
Golden and Ruttenberg"* called this development the evolutior,
of "industrial democracy" in which workers and management share
the duties and the rewards of the productive process. Hill and
Hook^ called it the union invasion of management functions.
The union motive for this broadening of wage policy was
not only a desire for higher wages hut was also a desire for
security and strength. The union vrorker desired a satisfac-
tory and steady wage. This made it imperative that the union
attempt to gain a maximum amount of control over the industry
that had in the past left him Jobless.
"Fringe wage" provisions were included in many union con-
tracts. They included various provisions for obtaining pay
increases by indirect means. Some of these provisions were:
(1) paid holidays
(2) vacations with pay
(3) compensation for reporting on days when no work was
available
^Golden & Ruttenburg, 0£. ci
t
.
^Lee H. Hill and Charles R. Hook, Management at the
Bargaining Table , p. 136.
<
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(4) increased overtime rates.
On January 19, 1939, the President of the General Motors
Council of the United Automobile Workers recommended that an
annual income guarantee and a 30 hour week at the present wage
level be written into a new General Motors contract. This was
concrete evidence of a new concept of wage policy. The U. A. W.
pointed out the inadequacy of the annual wage in the automotive
industry and stated that General Motors and the automobile
manufacturers could afford to pay a guaranteed annual wage bettejj:
than any other industry in the United States. The General
Motors Council said, "¥e are not against technological improve-
ments ....... but we do insist on sharing the gains of such
progress. Improved machinery should not merely mean greater
profits for corporations. It should also mean greater income
for labor and more lei3ure--not the leisure of unemployment but
the leisure of a 30 hour week and wages adequate enough to make
the leisure a blessing rather than a curse."
On March 6, the C. I. 0. Uews noted that contracts ne-
gotiated in steel within the last few v/eeks included wage in-
creases, shorter hours, and strengthening of seniority clauses.'''
An S. W. 0. C. contract negotiated v/ith Continental Steel
Corporation a month later won union recognition, permitted dues
stewards to collect dues on company time, and shifted paydays
^
The C.I.O . News, January 19, 1939
''The C.I.O . News, March 4, 1939.
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to every other Friday instead of tv/ice a month. These are
small hut important evidences of the increasing scope of wage
policy.
Harold J. Ruttenherg, Research Director of the C. I. 0.,
attacked the technological unemployment caused hy the new
automatic strip mills in an article entitled "The Big Morgue".
He claimed strip mills had caused 85,000 men to he displaced
and concluded that all developments indicate to the union the
inevitability of the 30 hour week at existing, or more likely,
higher wages. He explained that only through the common action
of labor, industry, and government that such problems could be
solved .
^
In May the new executive board of the United Automobile
Workers, C. I. 0., ordered an intensive organizing campaign
in the nation's important and rapidly growing aircraft industry.
President Thomas launched the drive with the traditional wage
policy arjproach, "Although work in aircraft plants is in a
great many cases similar to that in automobile plants, aircraft
wages are in most cases 50 per cent below the wage rates in
organized automobile plants. This situation has no justifi-
Ication. "^^
The scope of wage policy was being broadened also in the
8The G. I. 0 . News, April 10, 1939.
'ibid.
10
The C. I. 0 . News, May 1, 1939
r
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rubber industry. The new contract v/ith the B. P. Goodrich
Company included maintenance of present wage rates, a new pro-
vision that 3 days notice or 15 hours pay be given before
lay-offs, paid vacations, and a flexible working schedule with
a 6 hour dpy, a 36 hour week and an 1800 hour yearly total
maximum. The new Firestone contract stated that no lay-offs
could occur until the hours had been reduced to 24 a week for
eight consecutive weeks.
The Alii s-Chalmers contract included a union bargaining
committee with full rights of investigation in case of com-
plaints. This committee was empowered to act in an advisory
capacity to management, was paid full time, and was given un-
restricted entrance to the shop.-*-^ This was definitely an
encroachment upon what had long been considered the rights of
management and placed the union directly in an advisory capacity
by contractual agreement.
The strike at Chrysler on October 13, 1939, concerned
contract provisions regarding the rights of union and manage-
ment. A strike notice was filed with the state board. The
union demanded a voice in the fixing of production schedules,
asked for higher wages, and wanted adjustment of certain working
conditions and hours.
The C.I.O . News, May 13, 1939.
The C.I.O . News, June 12, 1939.
The C.I.O . News, June 21, 1939

43
The company resisted the attempts of the union to be
allowed a voice in determining production schedules and as-
serted that the grievances mentioned by the union were non-
existent. When a solution of the differences failed to mater-
14
ialize a strike was called.
After more than a month of deadlock the G. I. 0. abandoned
its demands for a voice in management and centered its attack
on the Chrysler wage rates. President Thomas of the C. I. 0. -
I. A. V/. criticized Chrysler's wage rates by stating, "The
subsistence wage for a faraily of four in Detroit is $1,423
according to government figures. Chrysler production workers
do not earn anything near that amount. The average hourly wage
in June of this year was 93 cents. Given 40 weeks of work a
year, at 32 hours a week, Chrysler workers earn ^1,190 a year.
The issue, as we see it, has boiled down to this: more
profits for the stockholders and coupon clippers, or better
wages for the men and women who work in the plants. That
issue alone stands between us and the resumption of opera-
tions. t,15 The Chrysler strike was finally settled in early
December and the new contract included the following provisions:^
1. Blanket pay increases
14
15
16
IJew York Times , October 13, 1939, 1:4.
The C.I.O
. News, November 27, 1939.
The C.I.O
. ^ews, December 4, 1939.
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2. Farrowing of wage differentials between Detroit
plants by 1 cent
3. Bonus payments to second and third shift workers
4. Overtime pay provisions written into the contract.
During this period two distinct trends can "be noted in the
speeches of C. I. 0. leaders. The first was the increasing
publicity given to the development of the theme of labor's
equal partnership with industry, Philip Murray testifying
before the House Labor Committee said, "Steel workers are now
more than employees. They are citizens of the steel industry.
They have just as strong an interest in its welfare as manage-
ment. And through the S. 7/. 0. C. they are taking part in its
17development and improvement." Again in a Labor Day message
Mr. Murray cited that as a result of their own power, the
nation's workers were enjoying p measure of economic security
and freedom never before realized. Hot only were they enjoying
industrial democracy but wage standards had been raised, hours
of work reduced, and working conditions improved. This theme
was repeated by Clinton Golden in December. "If employers take
an intelligent liberal approach to the problems of their workers
they will find organized labor willing to cooperate in meeting
production problems.
. . . .
•^'^The C.I.O . >Tew3
, July 24, 1939.
^^The C.I.O . News, September 2, 1940
/
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The depression, Golden added "has shattered the management
infallability myth, and it is time labor was consulted on the
mental, as v/ell as the physical aspects of the productive
proce s s» "^^
The second development was an increasing use of statisti-
cal backing in the form of claims for wage increase with
specific references to the high profits and a rising price
level. This general tendency, although not a new concept, will
be found to be used increasingly by the C. I, 0. throughout the
remaining time considered. At the Second Constitutional Con-
vention, President John L. Lewis made the follov;ing report,
"Prom May 1938 to Ilay 1939 the index of industrial production
rose 17 points while the index of employees income advances less
than 4 points
Per the first time in our economic history, it has become pos-
sible for the major part of American Industry to operate with
full satisfaction while a quarter of the working population is
unemployed It is now no longer worth their while to seek a
program to re-employ these workers. "^^ Later addressing the
same convention Mr. Lewis said, "The real wages of American
workers must not be allowed to suffer from rising living costs,
and every effort must be made to stop profiteering and to adjust
wage levels to rising prices. "^-^ In September, Mr. Lewis
l^The C.I.O . News, December 16, 1940.
^^The C.I.O . News, October 16, 1939.
Sllbid
(/
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speaking on a National Broadcasting Company program said, "A
defense program administered solely by profit and millionaires
will "be a failure
23
LalDor demands adequate representation upon the policy making
agencies of government. Labor demands adequate representation
and not on the "basis that now exists of one lonely representa-
tive of labor to 100 millionaires."^^
It is interesting to note, however, that although union
alarms were sounded concerning rising price levels the C.I.O.
adopted a resolution that condemned as "pernicious" efforts to
tie wages directly to the cost of living.
New contracts signed continued to extend the use of "fring|
wage" agreements and agreements controlling in part manage-
ment's rights. The Baldwin Locomotive Union contract negotiated
in the latter part of 1939 included: overtime pay, a Monday-to-
Priday no-staggered week, and a newly incorporated vacation
which the C.I.O. estimated would add $50,000 to the employees'
24income
.
The C.I.O. publicized widely a nev/ provision of a S.Y/.O.C.
contract with the Jensen Creamery Machinery Company. It re-
ported, "The agreement is novel from many angles
22
23
24
'The C.I.O . News, September 9, 1940
The C.I.O . News, October 23, 1940.
The C.I.O . News , October 30, 1939.
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Seversl weeks ago the agreement was signed by both parties when
the company agreed to eliminate all bonus and time study sys-
tems and grant a general wage increase instead. "^^
The new General Motors pact in 1940 gave the G.I .0 .-U.A.W.i
1. A $7,000,000 "C.I.O. Dividend" in, the form of 40-hour
pay bonuses to all employees with 10 months seniority.
2. A $5,000,000 wage increase to iron out unfair wage
differentials throughout the giant company's many plants.
3. Appointment of a permanent impartial umpire, paid
jointly by the company and the union, who will have final
authority on the settlement of all grievances which come under
his jurisdiction.
The General Tire and Rubber Company ended an eleven week
strike i^ith the U.R.W. -G , 1 . 0. by signing a contract including
liberal concessions in paid vacations, and protection of wages
and grievance procedures.
It is interesting to note the provisions included in a
contract signed by a Cleveland Steel Union which was hailed by
the C.I.O. as a "Model Pact". T}iis gives evidence of the goals
of C.I.O. The provisions were:^^
1. Union Shop
2. Check Off
26
27
28
'The C. I.O. News, June 24, 1940.
The C. I.O. News
,
July 8, 1940.
'The c. I.O. New s October 21, 1940.
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3. Straight time seniority
4. A two hour pay provision if an employee reported and
there was no work
5. Employee compensation for all lost time "beyond the
workers control
6. Reclassification of all .jobs
7. Protection of seniority during military service.
The problem of technological employment was "brought into
the foreground at the S.V/.O.G.*s Second Wage and Policy Conven-
tion in Chicago. At this Convention 46 resolutions were passed
calling for the 6 hour day, the 30 hour week, and the $6 daily
wage. It WpS felt that unless steps were taken to evolve a
broad national program designed to solve the problem of tech-
nological unemployment, the Steel Worker's Organizing Committee
would feel compelled to demand the institution of the thirty-
29 30hour week in the steel industry.
In November of 1940, Mr. Lewis addressed C.I.O. convention
and said, "The C.I.O. therefore has every reason to push more
vigorously than ever for the adoption of its program for a
more lasting solution of unemployment insecurity, and the other
^^The C.I.O . News, Hay 27, 1940.
30An unsuccessful but interesting case of an attempt to
prevent technological unemployment centered in management's
proposal to eliminate running boards and with them thousands of
jobs. A plea by Local 65, United Automobile Workers of America
was entitled, "Ask Por a Running Board on That Jlew Car."^
aThe C.I.O . News, February 26, 1940.
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economic ills that beset us. This program calls for a progres-
sive raising of real wages and purchasing power for absorption
of all the unemployed through reduced working hours and expanded
production, and for legislation to insure security and oppor-
tunity for young and old people, the unemployed and the needy
who are not otherwise provided for. "31
At the end of 1941 wage, hour, and employment statistics
were
:
Average Hours^^
.
Average Hourly^*^ Total34
Aut omohile
Iron and Steel
Ruhher
per V/eek
Full Time
Employees
39.0
38.6
38.5
Earnings
Full Time
Employee s#
$1,086
^ .957
$ .927
Employment
(Thousands)
570
1,130
156
#lTote: Hourly earnings are not wage rates because they
include overtime and other monetary compensation.
Between 1938 and 1941 the following changes occurred.
Average hours per week rose 6.7 in automobile, 11.0 in steel
and 8.2 in rubber. Average hourly earnings rose 13.3 cents in
automobile, 12.7 cents in steel, and 8.6 cents in rubber.
Employment increased 87 per cent in automobile, 48 per cent in
steel, and 54 per cent in rubber.
3^The C.I. O. News, November 18, 1940
"^^The Management Almanac
,
1946
, National Industrial Con-
ference Board, 1946, pp 84-85.
33
Ibid.
, pp 80-81.
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
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In 1941 the defense boom was in full swing. War con-
ditions prevailed in industry even though declared war had not
"begun. Employment was at high levels, prices and wages were
rising, and the hours worker were increasing.
A letter sent to Curtis-Wright hy Clinton S. Golden in
June, 1941, stated in part, "Mismanagement is rampant and
inexcusable. Out of a sense of decency to your subordinates,
I shall not record any except those practices of mismanagement
that vitrlly impinge upon the question of wages. The bungling
of this matter naturally has effected production adver sely . "^^
The suggestion made to solve this difficulty was one to be
frequently advocated during the war, a joint union-management
production committee.
^^The C.I.O . Eews, May 19, 1941.
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Chapter VI
THE WAR PERIOD
Wage policy in this period was adapted to function under
unusual conditions. Shortly after the outbreak of war the
C. I. 0. agreed to participate in a voluntary plan to avert
strikes. This plan provided:
(1) There shall he no strikes or lockouts.
(2) All disputes shall he settled hy peaceful means.
(3) The President shall set up a proper War Labor Board
to avert working strikes,'^
On January 12, 1942, by means of Executive Order ITo. 9017,
the President created the National War Labor Board. ^ to carry
out the provisions of the plan. This marked the end of free
collective bargaining in its fullest sense for the duration of
the war. Hereafter a third party, the National War Labor
Board, played an important role in wage determination. The
Board, in effect, had Jurisdiction over all labor disputes
affecting war production.
The C. I. 0. reacted favorably to the plan but stressed
The C.I.O . News, December 29, 1941.
2This board was composed of twelve members (four public,
four labor, and four management) and had the authority to ap-
prove all wage increases where the total annual remuneration
v/as below $5,000.
3Harold W. Metz, Labor Policy of the Federa l Government
,
p. 21.
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that wages must be stabilized, and not frozen. President
Murray in a letter to C. I. 0. affiliates notifying them of
the National War Labor Board said, "In order that labors' rights
may not be infringed upon, however, '.'7e have opposed regressive
anti-strike legislation and have insisted that the most
effective way to prevent shortages is through voluntary agree-
ment on procedures for the peaceful adjustment of all disputes.
The general purpose of union wage policy was expressed by
the C. I. 0. resolutions on wages passed by a special meeting
of the C. I. 0. Executive Board.
^
"'jVHEREAS, (1) the most effective prosecution of the war
demands that the living standards of the workers be maintained
and constantly improved and growth of labor unions be guaran-
teed; and
(2) The living standards of the workers of the
nation are being seriously threatened as a result of the spir-
aling of the cost of living and the increased taxes upon the
low income groups; and
(3) Financial reports for 1941 show a tremendous
increase in profits for employer, after taxes, as compared to
1939, in such basic industries as steel, shipbuilding and
electrical, and machinery manufacturing, v;ith even greater
profits to be anticipated in 1942 due to vastly increased
^The C.I.O . News, January 19, 1942.
'The C.I.O . News, January 12, 1942.
(
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production. These returns clearly permit employers to pay wage
increases without involving corresponding price increases; and
(4) The burdens and sacrifices inherent in our war
effort must he borne equitably by all groups and segments in
our national life.
ilOV/, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED THAT:
(a) The Executive Board recommends to its affilia-
ted unions th^t there be incorporated among the demands in
current or anticipated collective bargaining wage conferences
one for a substantial wage increase and union security; and
(b) The fulfillment of this policy will assure
workers that their unions are guaranteed the right to live free
from attacks and they will receive 9 fair share of the national
income, v;hich conviction will unleash the unmeasured energy of
the workers for maximum v/ar production."
The C. I. 0. was ouick to formulate a wage policy based
on these resolutions. Two approaches were used in demanding
higher wages. The first was a direct demand for an increased
v/age on the basis of rising living cost. This procedure v;as
to utilize extensively statistical support for its arguments
before the end of the war period. The second approach con-
sisted of obtaining wage increases by the use of "fringe v/age"
demands, demands for concessions to iron out inequities existing
in the industry, or attempts to obtain higher wages by changes

in jo"b classifications.^ The Tilxecutive Board of the C. I. 0.
outlined four major principles on ^7hich a ?/age increase would
be granted:
(1) To compensate for changes in the cost of living.
(2) To correct inequities and inequalities.
(3) To correct substandard wages.
(4) To aid in the prosecution of the war.'''
On January 26, 1942, the C. I. 0. asked "Little Steel"®
for a dollar-a-day wage increase, union recognition, and the
check off of union dues.^ The demands were referred to the
National War Labor Board. In February the G. I. 0. demanded
a dollar-a-day wage increase from General l.Iotor s . "^"^ This case
was also presented to the Board.
On April 20, Philip Murray stated "There has been no wage
increase in any basic industry" and, "the C. I. C. is unalter-
abljr opposed to wage freezing as absolutely unnecessary and
profoundly dangerous. ""^"^
^Metz, o;d. ci
t
. p. 194, points out that since the Board
generally granted wage increases of a fixed number of cents per
hour to all em.ployees this action tended to reduce the differen
tial betv/een high and low-wage employees.
7
Metz, o^. cit
. , pp. 187-194.
g
"Little Steel" refers to plants other than those owned or
controlled by United States Steel.
9
The C.I.O
. News, January 26, 1942.
•^^The C.I.O . ^ews, February 9, 1942.
''''''The C.I.O. Hews
, April 20, 1942.
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On July 17 the Jlational ^'/ar Labor Board handed down the
decision in the "Little Steel" case that established the "Little
Steel" formula. This formula was to he the basis of cost of
living wage increases for the war period. The Board refused
the dollar-a-day increase to "Little Steel" but granted them
flat 5i cent hourly increases. This amounted to a 15 per cent
increase in wages since January 1, 1941. The Board said that
all workers v;ere entitled to this increase and if the employers
did not grant it voluntarily the Board would order it.^^ The
justification was the rise in the cost of living. Specifically
in the "Little Steel" case the Board said:
"For the period from January 1, 1941, to Kay 1942, which
followed a long period of relative stability, the cost of
living increased by about 15 per cent. If any group of workers
averaged less than a 15 per cent increase in hourly rates
during, or immediately preceding or following, this period,
their established peacetime standards have been broken. If
any group of workers averaged a 15 per cent wage increase or
more, their established peacetime standards have been pre-
served . " "-^
Wage policy after the adoption of the "Little Steel"
formula became a union effort to exceed the lim.its imposed
—
—
This refers to hourly wages v/hich was the basis used
for wage increases rather than earnings. Earnings rose sharply
due to longer v/orking hours and overtime payment plans.
13
Metz, op cit
. , p. 184, citing the "Little Steel" case.
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upon wage levels by the National ^)7ar Labor Boarc^. The complaint 3
of the C. I. 0. increased in strength as the was progressed but
the "Little Steel" formula was not broken.
In August, 1942, the U. A. 'H. set forth the following wage
goals at their annual conventi on: -^^
(1) To raise substandard wages.
(2) To eliminate wage inequalities on a plant, regional
and national basis.
These goals indicated that the union had been quick to
realize the area in which it must concentrate its wage attack.
In September the union obtained from General Motors a 4 cent
Wage increase, and retention of the 5 cent night bonus. A
demand for 7:^ cents for equalization purposes was refused. -^^
The principles governing wages were again supported by
the C. I. 0. at their annual convention v/ith the inclusion in
their text of resolutions adopted that, "Wages should be stab-
ilized but not frozen Tage freezing must be condemned as a
blow against the fullest prosecution of our war effort.
On January 25, 1943, Y/alter Reuther indicated that General
Motors workers v/ould demand a 5 cent wage increase and that
data were being collected "to do a proper over-all job toward
stabilizing skilled trade rates, establishment of union stand-
ards, apprentice programs, and other matters affecting this
type of v/orker." At the same time L'r. Reuther also advocated a
j-^The C.I.O. Fews
,
August 17, 1942.
15
16
The C.I.O . lews, September 2, 1942.
The C.I.O
. Slews , November 16, 1942.
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X7guaranteed 48-hour week as a war need. '
By February of 1943 union dissatisfaction with the exist-
ing wage controls was pronounced. The C. I. 0. Board said that
wage stabilization required "allowance for wage adjustments due
to the increased cost of living: elimination of inequalities and
a dropping of the 'Little Steel* formula as unfair to lower
paid workers, eaual pay for v/omen for equal wcrk, encouragement
of incentive pay systems, and upward job classification."
In March President lilurray suggested that the wage deadlock
be broken but that the National 'Var Labor Board be saved.
Again in May Mr. Murray stated that economic stabilization was
a complete failure and the government should "roll back prices
to September 15, 1942, or make the necessary adjustments to
meet the increased cost of living. "^^
At the 1943 Convention of the C. I. 0. President Murray
summarised labor's attitude toward wage controls saying of the
workers, "They need wage adjustments, they need to be free from
the shackles of the present national wage stabilization policy
of the government of the United States, they want to enjoy a
little more collective bargaining than they now enjoy, they want
to enjoy the right to adjust inequities and inequalities and
^'^The C . 1 .
0
. ITews
,
January 25, 1943.
•^^The C.I.O . ITews, February 8, 1943.
•'•^The C.I.O . LTews , March 27, 1943.
?0
The C.I.O
. ITews, May 3, 1943.
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their grievances in a regular fashion as set forth in their
collective bargaining agreements without interference."^-^
In Pehruary the C. I. 0. v;as strenuously opposed to the
use of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics as the source
2?for the index upon the cost-of-living. The C. I. 0. conduc-
ted a joint study of the cost-of-living in conjunction with
the A. P. of L. and concluded the Bureau of Labor's index was
23too low. The results indicated these differences:
RISE IN COST OF LIVING
(Per cent)
Bureau of Labor C .1.0. -A. F. of L.
Stati sties Survey
Food 40.2 74.2
Clothing 35,7 72.2
Rent 3.0 15.0
House Furnishings 27.8 62.0
All Commodities 23.4 43.5
The reasons stated for this discrepancy were:
(a) Failure on the part of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
to consider quality deterioration.
(b) Inadequate selection of items.
(c) Failure to recognize changes in expenditures due to
war-time conditions.
^•'•The C.I .0 . News
, November 8, 1943.
22The United Steel Workers also made extensive studies of
the cost of living in Braddock, Pennsylvania in 1943.
23 *
The C.I.O
. News
, February 7, 1944.
«
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(d) Over ceiling prices.
On March 27, the C. I. 0. pointing out that the cost of
living was still rising, presented demands for wage increases.
Again steel was chosen and a twenty-four point program was
presented. Included in the program were demands for a 17 cent
24hourly wage increase and a guaranteed annual wage. The case
v/ent to the Board and employers and union leaders were called
to testify.
President L'^urray testified that the steel workers were
going into debt at the present wage level. The average weekly
expenditure of the steel worker was claimed to he :|58.57, while'
his weekly earnings averaged ^56. 04.^^
The case v/as not settled during the summer and in November,
President Murray charged that the N. ^,7. L. B. had shirked its
duty in allowing the union six days of testimony and employers
26
nine months and tv/enty-four days. Soon after, the Board
settled the case. The wage boost r/as refused and the "Little
Steel" formula was retained. A 4 and 5 cent shift differential
v/as allov/ed to the second and third shifts respectively, 5 cents
an hour was granted to remove wage inequities, a v;eek's vaca-
tion was allowed for each year's employment up to 5 years with
a .5-week maximum, and provisions for severance pay were to be
negc t ia ted . 27
24The C.I.O
. News, March 27, 1944.
25The C.I.O
. News, March 27, 1944.
^^The C.I.O . News, November 20, 1944.
^"^The C.I. O. News, November. 27, 1944.
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This was the last major attempt to break the "Little
Steel" wage formula. Sniping at its provisions continued, and
on February 5, 1945, the C. I. 0. Uews carried an article by-
Harold J. Ruttenberg, Research Director of the United Steel
Workers of America, criticizing the cost of living index. It
was headlined, "Cost of Living Ain't the Same But B.L.S. Won't
28Change Its Name". Later in February President Ifurray said,
"The bread and butter needs of American workers were flatly
ignored by public members of the U. V/. L. B. in a report by
them which said that wage rates have more than kept pace v/ith
Tising prices and that no revision of the Little Steel formula
is necessary."^® The attacks were ineffective, hov/ever, and
the formula was unchanged.
Statistically the war period shows interesting develop-
ments. At the end of 1944 wage, hour, and employment statistics
were
:
Average Hours^^ Average Hourly'^^ Total^-*"
per Week Earnings Employment
Pull Time Full Time (Thousands)
Employees Employee s#
Automobile 45.1 $ 1.312 708
Iron and Steel 46.7 $ 1.183 1,677
Rubber 46.6 $ 1.208 196
#Note: Hourly earnings are not wage rates, because they
include overtime and other monetary compensation.
2®The C.I.O. ITews, February 5, 1945.
pQ
The Management Almanac, 1946, National Industrial Con-
ference Board, 1946, pT). 84-85.
^ Ibid., pp. 80-81.
31
. .
.United States Department of Cbrailierce, Bureau of Labor
statistics. .
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Between 1941 and 1944 the follov^ing changes occurred.
Average hours per week rose 6.1 in automobile, 8.1 in steel,
and 8.1 in ruhber. Average hourly earnings rose 22.6 cents in
automobile, 22.6 cents in steel, and 27.8 cents in rubber.
Employment increased 24 per cent in automobile, 48 per cent in
steel, and 26 per cent in rubber.
These figures indicate that v/giges v^ere stabilized, not
frozen, and the workers in basic industries received a con-
siderable increase in money wages over the period.
c
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CHAPTER VII
COWCLUSIOIT
C. I. 0, wage policy increasingly has been used as a tool
to exercise greater control over industry. The desired end is
amhiguous and ill-defined, stemming from a dual desire for in-
creased earnings and greater security on the part of wage
earners. The most tangible expression of this goal is the con-
cept of "industrial democracy", in which the forces of labor
and capital are supposed to operate together for the benefit
of the workers and the capitalist.
Unionism is an element characteristic of the capitalistic
system. The concentration of pov/er and wealth in the hands of
capitalists, a concentration essentipl to modern capitalistic
enterprise, gave rise to the labor union as a means of protect-
ing the workers rights through collective effort. As long as
the demands of labor unions could be answered in the normal
operation of the present system there was little reason for
change. However, once the system v^as unable to solve satis-
factorily the problems of technological unemployment, cyclical
unemployment, and a satisfactory annual wage for the worker,
unions demanded these problems be solved even by modifications
of the system itself. This tendency toward modification was
not a long-run, planned movement but a gradual encroachment
upon management functions. ITew contracts imposed additional
restrictions pnd restraints upon employers and gave a greater
amount of control to unions. The guaranteed annual wage and
rc
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industrywide collective bargaining were natural evolutionary
developments in this process. By the very nature of the pur-
poses of unionism, the continuing demand on the part of unions
for higher wages can easily be understood, '^^ile the union
can perhaps justify its existence on the basis of the workers*
desire for social and psychological satisfaction, it would be
hard to visualize a successful union that could long operate
without showing concrete benefits to its members in the form
of increased wages.
Some problems immediately suggest themselves if the
broadening of the wage policy concept is continued. As the
unions persevere in the enlargment of the scope of their
activities to include such functions as planning of production
schedules, regulation of output, and dictation of the hiring
and discharging terras, the unions must also begin to share the
responsibility of management for the operation of the indus-
trial system. They become a part of management. They must not
only level their attacks upon management, but they must also
attack themselves for failure. Can the union do this and
survive? Are unions better able to fulfill the obligations of
management than management itself? A negative answer on the
part of unions to those questions v/ould provide a check upon
their program. A positive answer might evolve a truly impor-
tant modification of our economic system.
In the short-run, v/age policy is a very flexible device.
(
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It is an excellent organizing aid, it "becomes a policy of "hcld-
the line" in depression, and in all cases it aims to provide the
union member v/i th a greater share of the goods and services that
our economic machinery is able to produce. Perhaps its con-
stancy is at times reminiscent of Suckling's constant lover who
declared,
"Out upon it, I have loved
Three whole days together;
And am like to love three more,
If it prove fair weather."
f
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THESIS ABSTRACT-^
The Congress of Industripl Organizations was founded in
1936 to organize the mass-production industries along industrial
lines. In the initial organizing Toeriod wage policy was an
organizing aid. The unions promised the workers higher wages
as a reward for unionization. Employers attempted to forestall
unionism hy voluntarily granting their employees wage increases.
The same tool, wage policy, was used by "both union and manrge-
ment but for opposite ends. Organization was rapid and succes-
sful, however, in spite of strong employer oppisition. Average
hourly earnings, average hours worked per week, and total
emplojmient rose steadily.
In 1937-1938 a business recession threatened to wipe out
union gains. Falling prices ?nd unemployment brought insistent
demands from management for wage reductions. C. I. 0. wage
policy changed from an agressive policy aimed at obtaining
higher wages to a defensive policy nf "hold- the-line " in order
to maintain existing wages. The policy was supported by a
purchasing-power theory of wages. The unions did not consider
the effects of a rigid wage structure on the price level and
the volume of unemployment.
President Roosevelt supported the stand of the C. I. 0.
and stated that any reductions in cost should not be effected by
The study covers C. I. 0. v/age policy in the automobile,
rubber, and steel industries.
f
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a reduction in wages. Average hourly earnings were maintained
but the average hours worked per week fell and the volume of
unemployment increased.
Union organization was resumed with the recovery in 1938
and "by the outbreak of ¥orld ¥ar II the steel, rubber, and
automobile industries were largely organized. Average hourly
earnings, averape hours worked per week, and total employment
rose. Tv/o distinct wage policy developments occurred.
First, the area of wage policy was bropdened to include
fields that management had hitherto considered as sacred to
them.selves. This was accomplished by demanding mutual consent
clauses, joint committees, unlimited arbitration in grievance
procedure, union controlled working hours, seniority provis-
ions, industry-wide bargaining anri a guaranteed annual wage.
Closely allied with this development were union "fringe
wage" demands. These were indirect demands for wage increases
They included vacations with pay, paid holidays, and overtime
or shift differential payments.
Secondly, a new slogan, "industrial democracy", was used
to describe a system in which labor and management became
partners in industry. This concept conceived the union not only
as an instrument to promote the v/orker' s economic v/elfare but
also one to satisfy his social and psychological desires.
Soon after the out-break of world Y/ar II labor signed a
voluntary no-strike pledge. The National War Labor Board was
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created v/ith four representatives from management, four from
labor, and four from the pulolic. Tages were stabalized, not
frozen. Wage increases were granted to compensate for changes
in the cost of living, to correct su'o- standarri vrages, to
correct inequities and inequalities, and to aid in the prosecu-
tion of the v/ar.
The "Little Steel" formula was devised as the standard to
govern wage increases. This formula measured changes in the
cost cf living by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Cost-of -Living
Index.
The C. I. 0. tried to break the "Little Steel" formula.
The point of attack was the cost of living index. The C. I. 0,
contended that this index no longer measured the true cost of
living. The "Little Steel" formula remained, however.
The C. I. 0. was more successful in obtaining wage
increases through inriirect means. Sub-standard wages were
raised, inequities and inequalities were removed, and "fringe
wage" demands v/ere often granted. Average hourly earnings,
average hours worked per week, and tot^l employment all rose.
In the whole period between 1936 and 1945, wage policy
proved a very flexible device. In reality there was not one
wage policy but many, each designed to promote a desired goal.
Geographical wage differentials were attached by extending the
jarea of unionization, plant wage differentials were narrowed
by a urogram of job reclassification. Wage policy aided organ-
ization, held- the-line in depression, and in all cases aimed to
f
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provide union members with the greatest share obtainable of the
goods and services produced.
The broadening of the wage policy area was a potential
force that threatened to change the nature of our economic
system. If the unions continue to invade the field of manage-
ment, they may find themselves no longer a trade union in the
traditional sense of the T/ord but a new type of organization
carrying out management's functions and sharing management's
responsibility for the operation of industry.
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APPEInIDIX a
Average Hourly "^arnings#
In Three Industries
(Dollars)
70.
Automobile s Iron and Steel Rubber
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
.752
.791
.916
.953
.953
.971
1.086
1.248
1.295
1.312
.655
.670
.818
.830
.841
.850
.957
1.037
1.135
1.183
.801
.756
.847
.841
.863
.876
.927
1.010
1.125
1.208
#lTote: Hourly earnings are not wage rates because they
include overtime and other monetary compensation.
Source: The Tvianagement Almanac
,
1946, ITational Industrial
Conference Board, 1946, pp. 80-81.
e
Average Hours Per Week
In Three Industries
Automobile s Iron and Steel Rubber
1935 37.4 34 .2 33.1
1936 37.7 39 .8 36.6
1937 35.3 36 .6 33.3
1938 32.3 27 .6 30.3
1939 34.9 34 .6 35.5
1940 37.3 36 .1 35.4
1941 39.0 38 .6 38.5
1942 44.5 39 .0 40.9
1943 45.5 43 .0 45.5
1944 45.1 46 .7 46.6
Source: The ITanagement Almanac
, 1946, National Industrial
Conference Board, 1946, pp. 84-85.
ci
APPENDIX C
Total Smployment In
Three Industries
(Thousands)
Automobiles Iron and Steel Ruhber
1935 445 777 115
1936 459 895 121
1937 517 1,021 130
1938 305 762 101
1939 402 991 121
1940 465 1,134 127
1941 570 1,130 156
1942 510 1,992 155
1943 705 1,737 192
1944 708 1,677 196
Sources Data adapted from series published in The Monthly
Labor Revie"w , United States Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
c
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